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In the St1prei11e Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
EDWARD STEVENS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FEARN GRAY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 7781 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for respondent is unable to agree with the state-
ment of the case contained in appellant's brief. 
Said statement contains considerable argument which 
is again repeated in appellant's argument which resulted 
in much unnecessary repetition. 
Counsel has advised this Court often in his brief of the 
elapsed time between the case being submitted and the 
Court's decision. The Court will take notice of the record 
and minutes contained therein; hence, we will discuss the 
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matter no further, except to call the Court's attention to 
the fact that the term of the Trial Judge expired in Janu-
ary, 1949, and cormsel stipulated that the Judge might de-
cide the case subsequent to his leaving office (R. 105). 
Not only do we disagree with many statements of coun-
sel in his statement of the case, but we hesitate to pass un-
noticed counsel's argument of the matter in his statement 
of the case. 
We wish to observe in answer to the statement of the 
appellant's counsel on page 3 of his brief that the elapsed 
time between the submission of this case and the memoran-
dum decision apparently resulted in much more confusion 
of the rna tter to counsel than to the Trial Court. 
On page 3 counsel launches into a heated argument 
with respect to the appellant's claimed credit of $215.00, 
and his contention that respondent admitted that he re-
ceived $77,145.49 instead of the $76,145.49 with which he 
was charged by the Court. 
Both the respondent and the Court agree with appel-
lant's statement at the bottom of page 4. No question was 
ever raised as to the purchase of five hundred twenty-five 
(525) head of cattle by appellant, or as to the expenditure 
of $26,303.47 for same. 
As to appellant's statement on page 5 of his brief, it 
is observed that appellant claims total advances in the 
amount of $38,086.14. May we call the Court's attention to. 
the fact that the Trial Court awarded appellant $38,294.49, 
or $203.42 more than appellant claimed (R. 50). 
On pages 5 and 6 of his brief counsel sets up a straw 
man and then attempts to knock it over. He discusses the 
$4300.00 note and the payment of the same; that defend-
ant admitted the payment by plaintiff of $3300.00, and al-
'r 
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leged payment by defendant of $1,000.00. Appellant pro-
duced the bank cashier, and after some preliminary ques-
tions it was stipulated that Mr. Dixon, the cashier, would 
testify that defendant paid $1,000.00 on the note March 
18, 1941, and that Stevens paid the balance (Tr. 81). 
It is to be observed that the respondent testified that 
he did not pay the $1,000.00 on the note. It will be observed 
that defendant testified that he went into the bank and 
paid Mr. Dixon. Apparently the balance of defendant's an-
swer was not noted by the reporter, and dashes are inserted 
after the word Dixon (Tr. 423). 
We submit that in face of the pleading and the stipu-
lation that there is no occasion for argument on that mat-
ter. In the course of our argument we will explain our po-
sition and call the Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to 
amended counterclaim wherein that credit is recognized 
(R. 64). 
Counsel further confuses the issue by stating at the 
bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7 of appellant's brief 
that defendant stipulated that the $1,000.00 overpayment 
was paid to defendant, and that he should be charged with 
the same. There is no dispute upon the question of the 
overpayment to defendant by Cudahy Packing Co., defend-
ant has admitted and fully accounted for the same in his 
pleadings, which is evidenced by the admission in evidence 
of Exhibit "U", which admission was moved by defendant's 
counsel (Tr. 623). 
On page 9 of appellant's brief it is admitted that de-
fendant purchased eight hundred eighty (880) head of 
cattle, which number plaintiff admits, but alleges that he 
does not know for whom some of the cattle were purchased. 
Plaintiff raises objection, however, to the fact that he did not 
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participate in the purchase of some of said cattle. There 
is no question from the record, however, that the cattle 
were all purchased for the partnership. 
On page 11 of appellant's brief it is conceded that de-
fendant purchased eight hundred eighty ( 880) head of 
cattle, and paid for said cattle $47,243.66. The Court al-
lowed defendant that exact amount (R. 80). 
Appellant in his brief, on the bottom of page 11 and 
top of page 12, alleges that there is no controversy as to 
the claim for credit set out in B of paragraph 8 of defend-
ant's amended counterclaim, except the item of $4.08 and 
the claim for interest. The Court's attention is called to 
the fact that counsel for appellant inadvertently refers to 
B in paragraph 8 instead of A in paragraph 8 (R. 42). The 
total amount claimed by defendant under A, paragraph 8 of 
his amended counterclaim (R. 42) is $4,350.73; appellant' 
objects to the item of $4.08 and admits that defendant is 
entitled to the balance of $4,346.65. 
Appellant admits on page 12 of his brief all credits 
claimed by defendant under B of paragraph 8 of his amen-
ded counterclaim in the amount of $2,849.45. 
By the time counsel reached page 13 of his brief he 
forgot what he had said on pages 1 and 2 of his brief as 
to the filing of amended pleadings to conform to the proof, 
and observes that defendant in his original counterclaim 
alleges that he was entitled to be paid thirty-five cents a 
day per animal for feeding the partnership cattle, and that 
he later claimed in his amended counterclaim an allowance 
of thirty- six and a half cents per day. 
The next seven pages of counsel's brief and down to 
the middle of page 21 of his statement of the case is de-
voted to a discussion of the testimony of the various wit-
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nesses with respect to feeding of cattle. We cannot agree 
that counsel's statement of the testimony is correct, or that 
all of the testimony with respect to the matter has been in-
cluded in counsel's statement. 
We shall not attempt to analyze the testimony of the 
various witnesses referred to from pages 13 to 21, but will 
discuss the testimony in our argument in the case. 
On pages 21 and 22 of counsel's brief he discusses de-
fendant's use of his personal automobile with respect to 
the partnership business; and observes at page 22, "The 
evidence will not support a finding that defendant drove 
his automobile on partnership business to exceed 15,000 
miles." Counsel then observes, "We do not know what the 
Trial Court found as to mileage or cost per mile, but if he 
found the cost of operating an automobile was seven cents 
per mile, such finding would find support in the evidence." 
Defendant claimed credit for the use of his personal auto-
mobile in the amount of $1,000 (R. 48, par. 12). We believe 
the evidence supports the contention of defendant that he 
drove his automobile for the business of the partnership in 
excess of 20,000 miles. We are constrained to call the 
Court's attention to the fact that in addition to the trips 
referred to by plaintiff in his brief on pages 21 and 22, the 
evidence discloses that many trips were made by defend-
ant from Payson to Salt Lake City and Ogden. That many 
trips were made to Dog Valley and Sage Valley; that trips 
were made to Richfield, Minersville, Heber City, Fairfield, 
Nephi, Delta, Fillmore, Milford and Spanish Fork. If de-
fendant were allowed credit at seven cents per mile on 
15,000 miles, as conceded by plaintiff's counsel on page 22 
of his brief, it would amount to $50.00 more than defendant 
has asked for the use of his personal automobile. 
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For counsel's information we wish to advise him and 
the Court that defendant was not allowed credit for the 
use of his automobile on partnership business for the 15,000 
miles which plaintiff suggests was the miles traveled. In 
fact, no allowance was made, whatsoever to the defendant 
for the use of his automobile. An examination of para-
graph 5 of the Court's findings of facts (R. 80 and 81) dis-
closes that no credit whatsoever was given for the use of 
defendant's automobile claimed by defendant in paragraph 
12 of his amended counterclaim (R. 48). 
We have already advised the Court and counsel of our 
intention to rely for affirmative relief upon the Court's 
failure to allow $1,000.00 for the use of defendant's per-
sonal automobile. 
We have likewise .advised the Court and counsel that 
we claim $1,701.23 which the Court failed to allow as in-
terest paid by defendant in excess of any interest paid by 
appellant. 
We have likewise advised the Court and counsel that 
we claimed $1,542.56, the reasonable value of thirty-one 
(31) head of Minersville cattle purchased by plaintiff in 
1936, and not accounted for by plaintiff. 
POINTS TO BE COVERED IN DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent in his argume~t will discuss his case under 
the following points: 
POINT ONE 
The Trial Court committed no error in receiving tes-
timony as to the reasonable value of feeding cattle. 
, 
r 
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POINT TWO 
The Trial Court committed no error in making its find-
ing No. 5 (R. 80) and in allowing defendant credit for the 
items mentioned in Point Four of plaintiff's assignment of 
errors. 
POINT THREE 
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to give 
plaintiff credit for the sum of $215.00 for feeding forty-
three (43) head of cattle during the winter 1946-1947 (1936-
1937) mentioned in Point Two of plaintiff's assignment of 
errors. 
POINT FOUR 
The Trial Court committed no error in making its find-
ing No. 5 (R. 80) and in allowing defendant credit for the 
items mentioned in Point Three of plaintiff's assignment 
of errors. 
POINT FIVE 
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to find 
that defendant received for his own use the sum of $77,145.-
49 from the sale of partnership cattle mentioned in Point 
Five of plaintiff's assignment of errors. 
POINT SIX 
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to find 
that defendant received for his own use the amounts men-
tioned in Point Six of plaintiff's assignment of errors. 
POINT SEVEN 
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to charge 
defendant with at least thirty-one (31) head of partnership 
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cattle mentioned· in Point Seven of plaintiff's assignment 
of errors. 
POINT EIGHT 
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant $1,000.00 
for the use of defendant's personal automomile in trans-
acting partnership business. 
POINT NINE 
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant $1,701.23, 
being the amount paid by defendant as interest in excess 
of the amount of interest paid by plaintiff. 
POINT TEN 
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant the sum of 
$1,542.56, the reasonable value of thirty-one (31) head of 
Minersville cattle purchased by plaintiff for the partnership 
in 1936, and not accounted for by plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN 
RECEIVING TESTIMONY AS TO THE REJASON:ABLE 
VALUE OF FEEDING CATTLE. 
Counsel, in his brief ((PP. 25-30) discusses what he 
denotes Elementary Principles of Law with respect to the 
duties and obligations of one partner to his co-partner. 
We have adopted the uniform partnership law and, 
of course, the analogy of what is required by a guardian, 
executor and administrator in his relationship with his. ward, 
testator or decedent under our probate code, is quite foreign 
to the subject in hand. 
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The guardian is transacting business for either a minor 
or incompetent 'person, either of whom are presumed to be 
unable to sense or understand what is being done by the 
representative. As to the executor and administrator, they 
stand in a representative capacity for a decedent. No such 
relationship exists as to partners. 
In paragraph 2 of plaintiff's amended complaint it is 
alleged, among other things, that plaintiff and defendant 
agreed to engage in the business of buying, feeding and sel-
ling cattle, particularly steers, to be fed and sold for beef. 
Counsel presents to the Court a two-horned dilemma; 
he suggests that he is willing to concede that defendant is 
entitled to 25c a day per head for feeding steers on the Gray 
ranch (R. 60), then he argues that unless the Court ac-
cepts his proposition of 25c per head per day that every ex-
pense must be minutely itemized in order for the Court to 
make an allowance for the same (PP. 46-47) appellant's 
brief. 
May we observe at the outset that it may be reason-
ably inferred that Stevens at all times knew the basis upon 
which Gray was undertaking to feed the cattle. Stevens 
did know that the cattle were being fed hay and grain raised 
by Mr. Gray, on the 600-acre ranch leased by him (Tr. 160). 
Gray also fed barley, corn, bran and cotton-seed meal. Ste-
vens cannot claim ignorance ten years after the feeding 
was done, and then demand of Gray that he furnish item-
ized accounts of the costs of feeding which occurred at a 
time when he knew of the expenses for feeding. 
It is admitted that no agreement as to the charge of 
feeding cattle by Gray was ever made (Tr. 22); nor is there 
any indication from his testimony that he had any under-
standing with Gray as to a rate of 25c per day per head; 
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nor does the testimony disclose any implied understanding 
that the feeding would cost less than the reasonable cost of 
the materials, hay, grain, cotton-seed meal, bran plus labor 
and use of wagons and teams. 
No charge has been made for the personal services of 
the defendant, but only the reasonable cost of the materials, 
men, teams and wagons employed in feeding the partner-
ship cattle. 
We have no quarrel with counsel as to the language 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of 
"Nelson v. Matsch," 38 U. 122, 110 Pac. 865, and quoted by 
counsel on pages 25 and 26 of his brief. We subscribe fully 
to the language there used: 
"Partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each oth-
er, and each must use the utmost good faith toward his 
associates in all partnership business, and, where one 
partner by false representations obtains an undue ad-
vantage over another in a partnership transaction, 
equity will grant the defrauded party relief." 
There is no question of Gray's good faith. No undue 
advantage was ever obtained by Gray through false repre-
sentations measured by any equitable standard. Testimony 
most certainly discloses that Stevens and not Gray was the 
man who obtained money for nothing, or something more 
than his contribution to the partnership. Gray is not ask-
ing any compensation for personal services for his personal 
supervision of the cattle at Sage Vialley after he was noti-
fied that unless they were taken care of the partnership 
would lose the cattle. It was Gray, and not Stevens, who 
plowed through the January snow from Nephi to Sage Val-
ley. While Stevens warmed his toes in his own home, Gray 
was out looking after the partnership business. Stevens 
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testified that he frequently visited Gray's ranch in the win-
ter of 1937 and 1938. The evidence is undisputed that he 
never made a trip to Mosida. That the cattle were either 
looked after by Mr. Gray or his son-in-law (Tr. 168). 
Counsel quotes from 47 C. J., page 771-2. 
May we observe that Stevens not only had a right to 
know-presumably he did know all that could be known 
concerning the partnership affairs. 
Counsel has urged that the obligation to keep accurate 
books and accounts was the sole obligation of Gray, and 
cites 47 C. J. 785 in support of such proposition, but counsel 
omitted to finish the sentence in his quotation. The bal-
ance of the sentence appearing in 47 C. J. 785, omitted from 
plaintiff's brief on page 26, reads as follows 
". . . . . unless where the business is run without 
books with the knowledge and consent of the partners." 
The record is devoid of any agreement or understand-
ing that records showing the itemized expense of operating 
the partnership were to be kept. Of course, the absurdity 
of counsel's position is made manifest by his claim for win-
tering cattle in 1937 and 1938 at a fixed price per head, as 
set out in paragraph 6 of plaintiff's amended complaint 
(R. 32). If plaintiff expected any more bookkeeping than 
that shown by defendant's counterclaim he certainly shows 
a lack of goOd faith in waiting nine years, and then demand-
ing that he be unjustly enriched because of the absence of 
records which he at all times knew did not exist. 
Counsel quotes Sections 69-1-16, 17 and 18, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. We believe that the sections lend little 
comfort to counsel and are fully met by the evidence of-
fered by defendant. Section 69-1-16 requires that the 
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partnership books be kept at the principal place of business 
of the partnership, and that every partner shall have ac-
cess and may inspect and copy any of them. Where was 
the principal place of business of this partnership? Was it 
at Stevens' home, at Gray's home, at Stevens' ranch or at 
Gray's ranch, at the Bank of Spanish Fork or the Commer-
cial Bank of Spanish Fork? There is no evidence that Ste-
vens was ever denied a full opportunity to acquaint himself 
with the manner in which the cattle were fed on Gray's 
ranch. There is no intimation that Stevens was ever denied 
the rights granted a partner under Section 69-1-17. Ste-
vens has not testified or claimed that he ever demanded 
any information concerning the partnership which was de-
nied to him. RJather, it is presumed that whatever infor-
mation he sought, he obtained. He has never complained, 
either in testimony or pleadings, that Gray failed to furnish 
him full and complete information. Hlis conduct is explained 
not by his having been denied information, but by his dis-
appointment because of losses, and he is setting up his lack 
of interest as a basis to throw a larger share of the loss 
upon Gray. 
Section 69-1-18 requires a partner to account for any 
benefit that he has received and to hold as a trustee any 
profits derived by him, without the consent of the other 
partners, from any transaction, etc. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that Gray received 
any personal benefit or any profits from any transaction 
to which Stevens had not given his consent. 
Counsel quotes from the case of Paggi v. Skliris, 54 
Utah 88, 179 Pac. 739, to the effect that a partner will not 
be permitted to take advantage of any secret agreement 
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to receive a private or personal gain for the work on busi-
ness carried on by a partnership. 
We submit that the language quoted from that case in 
no \\ise fits the situation under consideration, and we be-
lieve that counsel will find nothing in the law that will sup-
port his contention that Gray is not entitled to the reason-
able value of the feed furnished the cattle, for the hired 
help, and the reasonable value of teams and wagons. Gray 
is not seeking to charge anything for his own services even 
though in equity he should be paid for what Stevens failed 
to do. 
In Volume 1 of Rowley on Partnership, Section 354, 
the author says: 
''The rule that each partner must be assumed to 
render his services in the partnership business gratui-
tously, is not inflexible nor of universal application. It 
has its exceptions founded in wisdom and experience. 
Where it can be fairly and justly implied from the 
course of dealings between the partners, or from cir-
cumstances of equivalent force, that one partner is to 
be compensated for his services, his claim will be sus-
tained . . . . . Where one partner has full charge of 
the business and others have acquiesced and devoted 
their time to their own affairs, an agreement to com-
pensa~ will be implied more readily than when all are 
giving equal attention to the business." 
It is our position, of course, that a partner owes abso-
lute fidelity to his partner, but that rule certainly does not 
go to the extent of permitting a partner who has given his 
own time to his own business and thrown the burden of tak-
ing care of partnership property upon his partner, to reap 
a further harvest in addition to his failure to do his share 
of the partnership work, and deny compensation for ex-
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penditures made to portect the partnership property (and 
this is most certainly true when the partner is fully aware 
that such expenditures are being made.) 
In Rowley's work on Partnership, Volume 1, Sections 
389 to 400, the author sets out the general duties of a part-
ner. Those are enumerated as follows: 
1. That he shall not secure a personal benefit rightly 
belonging to the firm. 
2. That he shall not purchase claims against the part-
nership at a discount and collect in full. 
3. He shall not secretly obtain profits that the part-
nership is entitled to, such as inducing a partner 
to sell his interest in valuable land, knowing the 
nature of the property, and without advising the 
partner of the known value. 
4. He may not speculate with or use partnership funds 
to make a profit, (if a profit is made he must share 
with his partner). 
5. He may not use his influence in securing a contract 
for the partnership and accept additional personal 
consideration for himself. 
6. A partner may not undercut the partnership by 
renewing a lease in which the partnership is inter-
ested (in his own name) when good faith requires 
its renewal in the name of the partnership, unless 
the other partner agrees that it should not be re-
newed. 
7. A partner may not hold secret commissions ob-
tained from a person dealing with the firm. If a 
partner uses partnership money to buy property 
and pays a certain amount, and in consideration 
for the payment he receives a cutback, the partner-
ship is entitled to an accounting on such cutback. 
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If he sells for less than full value and gets a com-
mission for his services, he will be accountable for 
the same. 
8. A partner may not conduct a business in compe-
tition, with a like business, of the partnership with-
out the consent of the partners. 
9. A partner cannot acquire his partner's interest un-
less in good faith, and a partner aware of a valu-
able asset not known to his partner cannot acquire 
his interest without disclosing the facts, nor can 
he escape responsibility by misrepresenting the 
value. If he talks down the partner's value in or-
der to acquire his partner's interest and buys it 
for less than it is worth, he must account for the 
advantage thus obtained. 
None of these principles are violated in the matter in-
volved before the Court. Gray is not seeking a profit. He 
is charging only for the reasonable value of the hay fed, the 
grain and the cotton-seed meal, etc. He is not charging 
more than the reasonable value for the use of his teams 
and wagons, nor any more than the actual expense for the 
man engaged in taking care of the partnership property. 
Stevens and Gray lived in the same county and in the 
same community (Payson, Utah) (Tr. 12 and Tr. 15). Ste-
vens was in a position at all times to know what was being 
done by Gray, and I think the Court would entirely ignore 
the facts if it failed to conclude that Stevens actually knew 
what was being done with respect to feeding the cattle. In 
fact, Stevens took a major part in selling the cattle from 
Gray's feed yard. 
Plaintiff testified that 403 or 405 head of partnership 
cattle were sold March 21, 1938. That plaintiff was there 
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when they were sold, that they were sold in his name, and 
they were contracted in his name (Tr. 24-25). 
On cross-examination plaintiff testified that he did not 
remember who he contacted for the sale of said cattle; that 
he could not say where he made arrangements; with whom 
he made the arrangements or whether the check was made 
to plaintiff or defendant (Tr. 95). 
Plaintiff further testified that he received the money 
for the 403 or 405 head of cattle (Tr. 87 and 97). 
The fiduciary relationship existing between partners 
does not require that one partner shall furnish his own 
property for the use of the partnership at less than its rea-
sonable value. 
In 47 C. J., Section 971, at page 1251, the author says: 
"In stating the account each partner is to be credi-
ted with every contribution which he has made to the 
partnership funds or property as shown by the books, 
or other competent evidence." 
Section 69-1-18, Utah Code (our partnership law) pro-
vides: 
"Every partner must account to the partnership 
for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits 
derived by him, without the consent of the other part-
ners from any transaction connected with the forma-
tion conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from 
any use by him of its property." 
Defendant's ranch was not partnership property; de-
fendant' hay was not property· of the partnership. Stevens 
had invested nothing in the ranch nor the hay and grain. 
No charge was made against the partnership for the use 
of the ranch property. 
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''All property originally brought into the partner-
ship stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or 
otherllise on account of the partnership, is partnership 
property." (Section 69-1-5, U. C. A. 1943). 
If defendant had paid 361/~C per day for feeding the 
partnership stock the partnership would be bound. (Of 
course, if it were shown that a partner paid out 361f2c per 
day per head and obtained some refund or personal com-
pensation or rebate back he would be required to account 
to his partner for that). 
Lundlay, in his work on Partnersip, at page 598, says: 
"Each is entitled to be allowed as against the oth-
ers, everything he has advanced or brought in as a part-
nership transaction, and to charge the other in the ac-
count with what the other has not brought in or has 
taken out more than he ought." 
In Vol. 2 of Rowley on the law of Partnership, Sec. 729, 
P. 1011, under title "Charges & Credits", the author says: 
''The firm is charged with what each partner has 
contributed to it." 
In Vol. 1, Rowley on Partnership, Sec. 364, P. 432, under 
section title "Right to Contribution" says: 
''It consists ordinarily of the right to be credited 
on the taking of an account and the making of a settle-
ment, with all property owned priva~ly and individ-
ually, that has been expended in the .carrying out of 
any 1'irm undertaking." 
In Vol1, Rowley on "Partnership," Sec. 398, P. 398-99, 
says: 
"A partner by being a member of a firm is not 
hindered from dealing with it in good faith so long as 
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the firm receives a fair consideration for its bargain 
..... A partner to whom the firm is indebted for goods 
sold may pay himself from partnership assets. A part-
ner also engaged in a separate business, is entitled to a 
fair market price for materials sold by him to the firm. 
(The author cites "Curry v. Charles Warren Co." (Del.) 
42 Atlantic 425.) 
In the case of "Curry v. Charles Warren Co." (Del.} 
42 Atlantic 426 (cited by Rowley P. 474 S. 398, the Sylabus 
reads as follows; and explains the general facts: 
("Where manufacturers of mortar were also en-
gaged in the sale of sand, lime, etc., one who was as-
sociated with them in the mortar business alone and 
who was entitled to a share of the profits th.ereo,f, was 
entitled to have the same, etc. charged not at its cost, 
but only as its fair market price.") 
The facts disclosed that Curry was a partner in the 
company engaged in manufacture of mortar, but not a part-
ner in the plaintiff engaged in furnishing sand etc. The 
Court at P. 426 (42 Atl.) said: 
"At the trial the plaintiff, after he had testified 
how much sand went into the mortar made by the de-
fendant company from the time of the assignment to 
it to the date of suit was asked, 'Do you know the cost 
of that sand to the Charles Warren Co.? If so state 
what the amount is.' (The assignment referred to ap-
pears to be assignment of a patented process for mak-
ing ready mix mortar.) 
The Court continued: 
"Mr. Nrields objected, contending that to ascer-
tain the price of materials used in the mortar business 
in this case, current market prices of sand, lime, hair 
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and such other materials as entered into its composi-
tion are the prices the Charles Warren Company, deal-
ers in lime, hair, etc., are entitled to charge for the 
sand and other materials. These prices represent the 
cost of materials to the mortar business, and are pro-
per amounts upon which to calculate profits." 
(Holding that the testimony sought viz, cost of 
materials, was not proper, the court said) 
"We think this testimony is not admissible. The 
contention made by the plaintiff is right if the premi-
ses were right; that is, if you were to put the Charles 
Warren Company in a fiduciary relation of an agent 
of the Charles Warren Company; in conjunction with 
this man, your premises might be right, and the cost 
price of the sand to them must be the price. But does any 
such relation subsist here? Suppose that the Charles 
Warren Company, at the time engaged in a large busi-
ness, among other things, in a large sand business, hav-
ing on hand large quantities of sand, which they bought 
say for 10 cents a load (Whether they had it on hand 
or bought it afterwards does not matter.) Then the 
question arises, if they hand over to the new concern 
1000 loads of the sand, whether they must i'urnish it 
at the cost price to them or at a fair market price. 
"If they do furnish it at what it cost them, then 
Mr. Curry being associated with them in the manufac-
ture of mortar, becomes a partner in the profits aris-
ing from the sand busi:pess, receiving profits from an-
other business. We cannot see that it would be right, 
unless the plaintiff can show that the sand used was 
bought specifically for this purpose and that they were 
therefore acting in a fiduciary capacity as agents in the 
mortar transaction. If they were not, you are bound 
by the market price, not the cost price. But that does 
not arise in this case. We think, therefore, that the 
testimony was not admissible." 
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We submit that the Gray Farm, hay, grain, hired men, 
pasture ,teams, wagons and trucks were not a part of the 
partnership property. If they are to be so considered, Ste-
vens would certainly be getting an unjust profit, as he fur-
nished none. He put no money into them. If Gray pre-
sented a loss and asked him to stand half, I fancy I hear 
the cry, ''Why should I, I was not a partner in the opera-
tions of the Loose Ranch." 
In the case of "Miles v. Miles" (Mont.) 282 Pac. 37, 
at page 41, Sylabus 5, the Montana Court said: 
"It is contended by the plaintiff that the court 
erred in overriili.ng his exception made to the credit 
of $3,287.85 allowed defendant as a charge against the 
partnership between Nov. 1st, ,1920, and Jan. 6, 1923. 
It is argued by plaintiff that the supplies furnished by 
the defendant could not have exceeded in amount 
$25.00 per month for each herder and employee and 
that at no time could the supplies have cost to exceed 
$50.00 per month." 
The Court found evidence conflicting but sustained the 
allowance. 
In the case of "Fuller v. El Paso Livestock Commission 
Co.", 174 S. W. 930 (Texas), it appears that the El Paso 
Livestock Commission Co. and John T. Cameron sued C. H. 
Fuller and 0. B. Fuller for an accounting. 
At page 933 (174 SW) under Sylabus 6 the Court said: 
"Error is also assigned to the admission of testi-
mony of J. T. Cameron as to. t~ expense' incident to 
the delivery of 3213 head of cattle at El Paso. The 
court's qualification of the bill shows that, when this 
testimony was admitted, the defendants had not pro-
duced in court any vouchers or other evidence show-
ing what had been the expenses of handling said 3213 
I i 
, I 
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head of cattle, and as defendants had received the pro-
ceeds of the sale of said cattle, and were entitled to de-
duct therefron1 the original purchase prioo and the ex-
penses of handling same, the court admitted the evi-
dence as tending to show what sums C. H. and 0. B. 
Fuller would be entitled to deduct as expenses of hand-
ling said cattle. The evidence was properly admitted 
for the reason indicated in the qualification." 
Counsel at page 27 and 28 of his brief cites the case of 
"\Vootten Land and Fuel Company v. Ownbey," 265 Fed. 
at page 91, as illustrative of. the kind of accounting which 
a partner must render in order to entitle him to credit for 
expenditures. That case is not applicable here; it involves 
an accounting to minority stockholders of a corporation. 
Books of account were provided and it was defendant's duty 
to maintain said books and keep the accounts under his 
obligation. 
Counsel omitted from said case one item which we 
think very significant. It is disclosed that Ownbey claimed 
$1,914.97, the same being expenditure for intoxicating liq-
uors. Objection was made to the item because there was 
no evidence showing the portion of the liquor used by Own-
bey for his personal uses. He testified, however, that it was 
all used for the company, and the Court observes: 
"We think that was sufficient to support the Mas-
ter's finding as further particularization could not rea-
sQilably be required of the final use of these liq.uors." 
In our case Stevens knew that the only books of account 
being kept were the bank accounts. He knew that when the 
cattle were taken into Gray's feed yard they would be fed 
the hay and grain raised by Gray. He knew that he was 
not supplying any feed for Gray and that he was not pro-
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viding hired men, wagons and teams to look after hundreds 
of head of cattle which Gray was caring for. 
We admit Gray was a sucker; he put in his full time 
for twenty-eight months while Stevens sat by waiting to 
grab the expected profits. Stevens knew no books were 
kept, he knew no agreement was made for keeping books. 
Stevens knew that the cattle were being fed for beef 
and that the larger cattle were being put into the feed 
yards (Tr. 156; Tr. 158). It is undisputed that the steers 
fattened by Gray weighed on the average of 1100 pounds 
when put into the fe€d yard and 1300 pounds when taken 
out (Tr. 197). 
We submit the following excerpt from the testimony 
(Tr. 196-197) is a confession by counsel that the Trial Court 
committed no error in permitting defendant to testify to 
the reasonable value of feeding cattle. The following ques-
tions were asked and answers given: (Tr. 196-197) 
Q. ''Do you know whether or not there are vari-
ous methods of feeding in this mountain country? What 
we wish to know is whether or not there is a basis of 
price per pound of gain; and a basis of so much per 
day per head, and how it is determined, whether or not 
you had-whether or not the weight of the animal 
makes any difference, as to the price per day. Do you 
know whether there is such a plan in this country? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "You may explain what the different plans 
are. 
A. ''The commercial fed lots are based on so 
much per day per hundred. 
Q. "Do you know whether or not that per hundred 
pounds is the weight of the animal; it that right? 
A. ''That is right. 
Q. "Can you illustrate? 
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A. ''Well, say for instance a steer weighs 300 
pounds at that time; it was four cents per hundred, that 
would be twelve cents a day to feed them; it would be 
four cents per hundred. 
Q. ''All right. 
A. "If the steer weighed a thousand pounds, it 
would be forty cents a day, and today it is 80 cents. 
Q. ''What did you say it was at that time? 
A. "Four cents per day per hundred. Now I am 
speaking of commercial lots. 
THE COURT: "AND TODAY it is 80 cents as 
compared with forty cents. 
A. "Yes, and for a thousand pound steer, that is 
pro rated out at the time the steer is weighed until he 
is finished. At the latter part of the feeding, he would 
be paying a dollar a day today. 
Q. "Do you know the approximate weight of 
steers being fed? 
A. ''I know approximately the weight of the 
steers I fed. 
Q. "What was the approximate weight? 
A. "My steers averaged around 1300 pounds out. 
Q. ''What would they average in? 
A. "They weighed something like 1100 pounds 
in. 
Q. ''Would that mean that the cost of feeding a 
1100 pound steer would be forty cents a day?" 
At this point counsel for plaintiff made the following 
opposition (Tr. 197) : 
MR. HANSEN: "We wish to object to this tes-
timony as incompetent; counsel started out to base his 
claim on the amount of hay and grain per day, and 
there is no objection to showing how many pounds of 
hay and grain and if he fixes the amount and the v~Iue 
of the hay and grain, I think that is the measure of 
damage." 
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We submit that counsel's assigned error number one 
is not made in good faith and that counsel's argument in 
his brief from the last paragraph on page 13 to the middle 
of page 21, and from page 38 to the last full paragraph on 
page 47 is completely undermined by counsel's statement 
that there is no objection to showing how many pounds of 
hay and grain, and the value of the hay and grain in fix-
ing the cost of feeding (Tr. 197). 
Counsel's admission was certainly sufficient to mis-
lead the Court, and in our opinion constitutes a waiver of 
his assigned error number one. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITI'ED NO ERROR IN 
ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS 
MENTIONED IN POINT FOUR OF PLAINTIFF'S AS-
SIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
We agree with counsel in his statement on page 38 of 
his brief that the cost of feed is not in dispute. Hay cost 
$8.00 per ton or .4 cents per pound, corn cost from $1.50 to 
$1.65 per hundred pounds or 1.5 cents to 1.65 cents per 
pound, rolled barley cost $1.40 per hundred pounds or 1.4 
cents per pound, cotton-seed meal (not oil) cost $50.00 per 
ton or 2.5 cents per pound, bran cost $1.00 per hundred 
pounds or 1 cent per pound (Tr. 354). 
Defendant testified that he fed barley, corn, cotton-
seed meal, bran and hay in the following amounts: 10 pounds 
of barley, 5 pounds of corn, 1 pound of cotton-seed meal, one 
pound of bran, and 30 pounds of hay per day per head (Tr. 
354-5). 
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Plaintiff's counsel admits that defendant testified to 
those amounts in his brief at page 38. Counsel computes 
the total of the amount fed per head per day at 37 cents 
lAppellant's brief, page 38). Counsel, however figures the 
price of corn at $1.50 per hundred; at $1.65 per hundred 
the cost per head per day fed as Gray testified would total 
37.75 cents. 
Plaintiff offered no testimony to dispr~:>ve the testimony 
of defendant as to the amount of hay and grain fed the 
partnership animals. Counsel admits it was proper for 
defendant to show how many pounds of hay and grain he 
fed and the value of the hay and grain in determining the 
defendant's credit for feeding (Tr. 197). 
The testimony of defendant is positive, and is undis-
puted, that he actually fed the quantities herein set out and 
the value of said feed is not in dispute. No witness was 
ever called to contradict the defendant's testimony. Plain-
tiff called as his witness Willis Provstgaard, who testified 
that he fed cattle for the defendant practically all the time 
including the years in question, 1937-38 and 1938-39 (Tr. 
439). He, likewise, testified as to the men, teams, and wa-
gons used in feeding the partnership cattle. In fact, plain-
tiff's counsel neither offered evidence to disprove his tes-
timony nor raised any serious question thereon. 
Mr. Provstgaard was called as plaintiff's witness; if any 
one was in a position to contradict the defendant's testi-
mony as to the amount of grain, bran, cotton-seed meal and 
hay fed, it was the man who actually did the feeding. Plain-
tiff's counsel, however, refrained from asking th.e witness 
any questions with respect to that matter; defendant's tes-
timony remains uncontradicted. 
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On the other hand counsel chose to dispute defend-
ant's testimony by testimony of certain other witnesses as 
to what they fed. That in no wise disputes defendant's tes-
timony. It is doubtless true that cattle can be maintained 
without losing weight on a much smaller feeding than when 
"being fed for beef," which was the principal purpose stated 
by plaintiff for entering into the partnership-to buy and 
feed cattle, particularly steers, "to be fed and sold for beef" 
(R. 29). 
We invite the Court to read the testimony of the wit-
nesses produced by plaintiff as to what they fed. In no in-
stance did any witness produced by plaintiff testify to com-
parable feeding-the same number of cattle. No witness 
testified to feeding the same type of cattle, and no witness 
testified to using the same feed as defendant. 
We shall not burden the Court except to make an ob-
servation with respect to the testimony of the following wit-
nesses called by plaintiff: Fay C. Packard (Tr. 442); David 
Jones (Tr. 93); Plaintiff, Edward R. Stevens (Tr. 520); Gil-
bert A. Johnson (Tr. 502); William Christmas (Tr. 555); 
Glen Cowan (Tr. 478); Vaughn Davis (Tr. 466); David Shu-
ler (Tr. 458); and Howard Stevens (Tr. 551). We invite 
tJhe Court to read the testimony of these witnesses. The 
most potent argument in answer to plaintiff will be found 
in their testimony. 
Mr. Packard testified on cross-examination that he 
worked in the bank, and our office hours are from "eight 
until we get through." (Tr. 451). That he never fed the 
cattle, but checked on them (Tr. 447). That he had no 
personal information with respect to the feeding except 
what the bookkeeper gave him (Tr. 452). 
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David Jones testified that he fed on the average of 
fifty head (Tr. 494); that the feeding period depended on 
the condition of the cattle (Tr. 496). He admitted on cross-
examination that in addition to the quantities of hay, bar-
ley and wheat set out in appellant's brief, he also fed two 
pounds of beet syrup per day (Tr. 500) . That he likewise 
fed beet pulp (Tr. 501). Mr. Jones was asked as to the 
average increase of weight during the feeding period; he 
admitted he had records which he could produce of the 
weights in and the weights out (Tr. 498). The Court per-
mitted him to answer with the understanding that the rec-
ords would be produced and made available to defendant's 
counsel (Tr. 499). The witness was never recalled to tes-
tify further, nor did defendant's attorney ever receive the 
records. 
Edward R. Stevens testified that he fed mostly corn, 
barley and alfalfa hay (Tr. 540). He testified that his 
statement as to the amount of feed an animal would con-
sume was not based on any records (Tr. 598-9). He testi-
fied that he did not know whether or not it takes mor.e feed 
to properly feed a larger steer than it would take to feed 
a smaller steer (Tr. 550). 
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that the 77 head 
of cattle fed by his son were the cattle shown in exhibit 
''F" (Tr. 581). 
Gilbert A. Johnson testified that he fed all kinds of 
cattle (Tr. 502). That he fed only about 30 to 60 head per 
year (Tr. 504). That he never fed steers alone, but steers 
heifers and cows (Tr. 505). That he fed pea silage and dry 
beet pulp in addition to the grain (Tr. 506). That he con-
siders a pound to a pound and a quarte:tr of grain per day 
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per hundred pounds of weight of the animal is good feed-
ing (Tr. 504). 
William Christmas testified that everybody feeds dif-
ferent, that he fed about a pound of grain per head per day 
for each hundred pounds of animal throughout the whole 
feeding period (Tr. 562). He testified that he did not know 
the weight of the cattle when put in his feed yard nor the 
weight when taken out (Tr. 568); that he just guesses at 
what he fed (Tr. 568). That he had no record of the gain 
in weight during the feeding period (Tr. 568-9). 
Glen L. Cowan (plaintiff's witness) contradicted the 
testimony of plaintiff and stated that larger animals con-
sume more than smaller ones (Tr. 480). That he fed seven 
and one-third pounds of grain per day and ten pounds of 
hay (Tr. 483). He testified specifically to feeding 220 head 
of yearlings in 1946-7 (Tr. 485). That he generally fed 
yearlings (Tr. 480); that the 220 head were steers and hei-
fers mixed (Tr. 481). He testified that steers eat more 
than heifers (Tr. 482). 
Mr. Cowan testified that the animals he fed in 1946-7 
went into his feed .Jot October 2nd, and were taken out one 
load per week beginning December 7th (Tr. 483); the last 
ones being taken out January 23rd (Tr. 482). Even if the 
220 head had remained in the feed lot until January 23rd 
the yearlings fed by Mr. Cowan in 1946-7 would have to eat 
over forty pounds of corn silage per day, if they ate the 
500 tons which appellant's counsel admits was fed to them 
(Appellant's brief page 39). The total period from Octo-
ber 2nd, 1946, to Janu_ary 23rd, 1947 is 113 days; the total 
animal days is arrived at by multiplying 220 by 113, which 
gives us 24,860 animal days and if each of the animals fed 
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by Mr. Cowan in 1946 were fed for the full 113 days, each 
would consume over 40 pounds of corn silage. 
David Shuler testified that he fed the partnership steers 
in 1937-8 under a written contract (Exhibit "K"). The con-
tract discloses that Shuler was to be charged six cents a 
pound for the total weight of the animals when taken in; 
and was to be allowed seven and one-half cents when taken 
out (Tr. 460). He testified that at the end of the 75-day 
period he refused to feed them any longer unless the price 
was "sweetened", and an oral contract was made for an ad-
ditional 29-day period under which he was to receive 8 cents 
per pound for the animals when turned back or an addi-
tional ~'2-cent spread during the whole period (Tr. 460-1). 
Shuler testified that he fed only alfalfa hay and eorn for 
the first 75-day period (Tr. 465). He further testified that 
during the whole feeding period he fed only corn and al-
falfa hay (Tr. 465). He admits he may have fed some 
pulp, but could not remember (Tr. 466). Shuler's contract 
gave him 2 cents per pound on the total weight of the ani-
mals fed, even though they were fed only enough to main-
tain their weight without any gain; if he took in a steer at 
a thousand pounds he would be charged $60.00; when that 
same steer was returned after the 75 days of feeding he 
would receive under the written contract $75.00, even if it 
had not gained a pound, or $15.00 profit for feeding the 
animal over a 75-day period no more than was sufficient 
to maintain it without losing weight. If the animal gained 
one hundred pounds in the 104 day period testified to by 
Mr. Shuler (Tr. 460) he would receive 8 cents per pound 
for eleven hundred pounds of weight, or $88.00. Since the 
animal was charged in to him at six cents a pound, or $60.00, 
he would be paid $28.00 for feeding 104 days only sufficient 
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feed to add 100 pounds total weight. When asked if he 
had any recollection as to what the steers increase in weight 
he answered, ''No, I would not be able to say" (Tr. 461). 
On further prodding by appellant's eounsel the witness gave 
it as his judgment that they increase one and three-quarter 
pounds a day (Tr. 463). Counsel asked the following ques-
tion: Q. "When you say a pound and a quarter per day is 
that what steers increase when they are properly fed?" 
and Mr. Shuler gave the following answer: A. "That is 
what I generally figure." (Tr. 463). Mr. Shuler testified 
he did not remember how much corn or hay he fed during 
the last 30-day period (Tr. 466). Counsel makes consider-
able of the fact that he fed during the last 30-day period 
for 30 cents per head per day, yet we have no evidence as 
to the amount of hay or grain he fed, nor as to any gain 
in weight, if any, during said 30-day period. 
Vaughn Davis was called as a witness for plaintiff; 
his testimony was substantially set out on PP. 17 and 18 
of appellant's brief. He testified that he was to get 10 
cents per day or 10 cents per pound of increase in weight 
(Tr. 467). He testified that he did not have to hire any 
help (Tr. 470); that he did not know the weights of the 
cattle when they were brought in, and he had no record 
of the gains in weight (Tr. 468). He testified he did not 
know the amount of hay he fed, the amount of barley he 
fed, the amount of wheat he fed nor the amount of beet 
pulp (Tr. 472). That he received intermittent payments 
for the feeding, that he didn't know the amount of any pay-
ment (Tr. 472). On redirect examination he testified that 
he fed about 20 pounds of hay per day, 8 pounds of grain, 
and 50 pounds of beet pulp per head per day (Tr. 474). He 
testified that he did not know when the cattle came in and 
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did not know when they were taken back ( Tr. 4 76). He 
testified that Mr. Gray furnished no feed, and that his 
brother got no grain from Gray. 
Lavar Davis was called as a witness for defendant and 
testified that he was a brother of Vaughn Davis (Tr. 587); 
that he and his brother owned the ranch where the Stevens 
and Gray cattle were fed, together (Tr. 587). He testified 
that hay other than that raised on the ranch was fed these 
cattle· (Tr. 587). That grain other than what was raised 
on the ranch was fed the cattle (Tr. 588). That he secured 
grain from Mr. Gray at Gray's ranch (Tr. 588). That he, 
Vaughn Davis, and another brother assisted in feeding the 
cattle (Tr. 488). That 3 tons of beet pulp was hauled each 
day from the Spanish Fork factory, a distance of 7 miles; 
that the full3 tons of beet pulp was fed each day to 64 head 
of animals (Tr. 589) . 
If the 64 head of cattle were fed 3 tons of beet pulp 
per day, they were fed more than 90 pounds per head per 
day. 
The testimony of Vaughn Davis is not only completely 
repudiated by his brother, Lavar Davis, but the very eon-
tract he claims to have had with the partnership shows a 
lack of any business sense whatsoever on the part of the 
feeder, and is entirely incredible. As heretofore observ~ 
his testimony was that he was to get 10c per day per head 
or 10c per pound of increase in weight (Tr. 467). Let it 
be assumed that the latter statement is the one he inten-
ded (l.Oc per pound of increase in weight). If Davis fed 
on the basis of 10c per pound for each pound of increase 
he certainly had a contract much less favorable than the 
Shuler contract. As pointed, in this brief, Shuler would 
receive for feeding a 1000-lb. animal for 75 days $15.00, even 
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if it never increased one pound in weight. The evidence dis-
closes that the contract with Shuler was sweetened to al-
low him 2c per pound of increase for feeding over a period 
of 104 days (Tr. 460-1). For a hundred pound increase 
under the 104 days Shuler would receive $28.00 for increas-
ing the weight from .1000 lbs. to 1100 lbs.; yet Davis testi-
fied he would have received only $10.00 
It is significant that when the testimony of Lavar Da-
vis is analyzed, it will be found that instead of receiving 
19.56c per day per head ,as claimed by counsel in his brief 
at page 43, it will be found that the Davises received in ex-
cess of 34c per head per day for feeding such as they fed 
which included no corn, no bran, no cotton-seed meal and 
no such quantities of concentrated food as were fed by the 
defendant. 
The Court must guess in each case as to what was fed, 
and likewise guess as to the increase in weight. 
At P. 19 of his brief appellant's counsel sets out the 
testimony of Howard Stevens; he stated that he fed 77 head 
of cattle in the winter of 1937-8 for a period of 130 days 
(Tr. 552). It was stipulated that the cattle fed by Howard 
Stevens are the cattle described in plaintiff's Exhibit "F'' 
entitled Bill of Sale, that it covered 46 head of steers, 25 
head of steers, and 6 head of steers (Tr. 581). Howard 
Stevens is the only -witness that affords any basis of com-
parative feeding with the feeding done by Gray. He testi-
fied under oath that the steers when taken in weighed about 
950 pounds. Exhibit ''F" shows the weight of cattle when 
sold out as follows: 
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46 Head 
25 Head 
6 Head 
77 
\VEIGHT 
49,307 
26,775 
5,578 
81,660 
33 
AVERAGE WEIGHT 
1072 
1071 
929 
The total weight of the 77 head was 81,660 or an av-
erage of 1060, the evidence conclusively shows that the 
cattle fed by Howard Stevens had an average gain of 110 
pounds over the full feeding period. It would appear from 
Exhibit "F" that some of the cattle lost weight; we are not 
surprised that at feeding such as Howard Stevens testified 
to that the cattle gained only 110 pounds, that is the type 
of feeding that barely keeps cattle alive. 
Counsel for plaintiff suggests that 25 cents a day is a 
proper charge to be allowed for feeding cattle. If it be as-
sumed that that is a proper charge for feeding cattle, the 
way Howard Stevens fed them, then a proper charge for 
feeding cattle the way the defendant fed them (so that they 
gained over a period of 141 days an average weight of 200 
pounds) (Tr. 197) would be 41.9 cents per day. Formula-
25 X 130/141 X 200j110 equals 41.9c 
Counsel suggests that the cost of feed supplied by How-
ard Stevens is valued at 19c (Appellant's brief P. 41). Coun-
sel made no allowance for services of Stevens which should 
be worth $2.50 per day or 3~c per day per head, or a total 
of 22%,c. 
With a gain of 110 pounds per animal over a feeding 
period of 130 days the gain per day would be .846 of a 
pound. We submit that with a gain of 200 pounds as tes-
tified to by Mr. Gray over a feeding period of 141 days the 
gain per day is 200/141 of one pound per day or a gain of 
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1.418 pounds per day. The cost of feed on the proportion-
ate basis of gain of weight per day furnished by Mr. Gray 
would be 1.418/.846 multiplied by 22.25, which is 37¥2 per 
day. 
As we have observed with respect to the feeding by 
Howard Stevens, there is an expense over and above the 
221,4 eents indicated on account of the pea silage fed and 
on account of the barley which he testified he fed during 
the first 30 days. It will likewise be observed that in com-
puting the cost of his feeding no allowance has been made 
for the use of any truck, gas and oil, nor for any horses or 
wagon; therefore, the actual cost of feeding by Stevens 
would be above the 221;4c by the additional items of pea 
silage, barley, truck, gas, oil, horses and wagon which must 
necessarily constitute additional expense. 
We, therefore, submit that the Trial Court was justi-
fied from the evidence offered by the defendant, which was 
never contradicted by the man who did the feeding (Willis 
Provstgaard), in allowing defendant 36lj2 c per day for feed-
ing the partnership cattle. In fact, no witness called by 
plaintiff ever fed cattle the amount of feed or variety of 
feed that the defendant fed. 
The only witness called who did feeding comparable 
to the feeding by the defendant was Rodney Martin; yet 
he fed no bran and no cotton-seed meal. Under examina-
tion by plaintiff's attorney he tetsified that he fed an aver-
age of 12 to 15 pounds of grain over the whole feeding pe-
riod (Tr. 606). He likewise fed 4 pounds of dried beet pulp 
molasses treated, and about 18 pounds of hay (Tr. 603). 
He further testified that during the early feeding period he 
fed 30 pounds of hay (Tr. 609); and that he fed 2 pounds of 
corn silage ( Tr. 604) . 
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We submit that an examination of the testimony with 
respect to feeding will lead to the conclusion that the Trial 
Court was justified in awarding the defendant 361j2 per day 
per animal for feeding the partnership cattle. 
Counsel likewise takes issue with the allowance by the 
Trial Court of $1.50 per month per head for pasturing part-
nership cattle, and has stated in his brief that the charge 
of running in Strawberry cost $1.00 per head per month 
(Appellant's brief, page 37). Counsel likewise called as 
a witness William Christmas, who testified that his charge 
for pasturing cattle on property he had leased at Keetley, 
Utah (the Fisher Ranch) was $1.00 per month per head 
(Tr. 561). 
We invited the Court's attention to the type of pasture 
used by the defendant compared with grazing on the Pub-
lic Domain and the pasture used by Mr. Christmas. At the 
top of the page (Tr. 158) the defendant described his ranch. 
He stated there were 600 acres, all under irrigation; that 
the same was divided into four separate pastures, that the 
cattle rotated from pasture to pasture, grazing a two-weeks 
period in each during which time the grazed pasture was 
irrigated and at the end of 6 to 8 weeks was again used 
for grazing the cattle. 
No description of the type of ground grazed in Straw-
berry was given, but it is a part of the Public Domain, and 
we submit far less valuable than the pasture such as de-
scribed by Mr. Gray. 
The ground operated by William Christmas consisted 
of 1900 acres of which approximately 500 acres was mea-
dow and the balance hillside (Tr. 571). The plaintiff tes-
tified on cross-examination as follows: 
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Q. "Mr. Stevens you say the winter of 1938, if 
I understood you correctly in the neighborhood of 
Keetley. 
A. "Yes, if I remember right. 
Q. ''How many cattle did you pasture? 
A. "20 head. 
Q. "How long did you pasture them? 
A. "Four months, if I remember right. 
Q. ''Whose pasture did you put them in? 
A. "It was at what they call the Fisher Ranch, 
William Christmas was taking the cattle to pasture at 
that time. 
Q. "Did you take the cattle up there yourself? 
A. "I went With them. 
Q. ''And you paid $80.00 for that pasture? 
A. "If I remember right, I did. 
Q. "Well did you? 
A. "I think I did. 
Q. ''You pastured them for a $1.00 per month? 
A. "That is right. 
Q. "Who did you pay it to? 
A. "William Christmas, if I remember right. 
Q. "You said they were on the Fisher Ranch? 
A. "Yessir, I did." (Tr. 543-4) ~ 
Mr. Christmas testified that he pastured cattle on the 
Flisber Ranch at Keetley for plaintiff, and that he charged 
plaintiff for taking the cattle from the ranch to the pas-
ture at Keetley in addition to the $1.00 per month (Tr. 566-
7). We submit that the pasture of Mr. Christmas in no 
ways compared with the 600 acres of irrigated ground de-
voted to pasture by the defendant. The Christmas ground 
was not in any way comparable with the pasture of the de-
fendant, and the evidence affords ample justification for 
the allowance by the Trial Court of $1.50 per month for 
pasturing the cattle of the partnership. 
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Counsel for appellant objects to the allowance by the 
Trial Court of labor, of four men at $2.50 per day per man 
and the use of the three teams, wagons and harness at $2.50 
per day in feeding the cattle. Defendant testified that four 
men were employed during the entire feeding period; and 
that they were paid either $2.50 or $3.00 per day; and that 
three teams and wagons were also employed during the 
feeding period (Tr. 420-2). 
Willis Provstgaard, called by plaintiff, testified that 
three men besides himself were employed, and either three 
or four teams and wagons. That the men were paid $2.50 
per day (Tr. 439-40). 
We direct the Court's attention to Paragraph 11 of de-
fendant's amended counterclaim (R. 46), and particularly 
to the credits claimed therein by defendant for pasturing 
and feeding partnership cattle. We likewise invite the 
Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to defendant's amen-
ded counterclaim, and particularly to Paragraph 8A there-
of (R. 58 and 59). It will be observed that plaintiff does 
not dispute defendant's claim for pasturing the cattle, but 
only disputes his charge in the amount of $1.50 per month, 
and admits with respect to each item defendant is entitled 
to $1.00 per month. 
We submit that as to any items set out in said Par. 11, 
not admitted by plaintiff, that the testimony fully supports 
the Court's finding as to those items (Tr. 157, 191, 192, 200, 
201, 245, 247 and 248). 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF CREDIT FOR THE SUM 
OF $215.00 FOR FEEDING FORTY-THREE HEAD OF 
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CATTLE DURING THE WINTER 1946-47 (1936-37) 
MENTIONED IN POINT TWO OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGN-
MENT OF ERRORS. 
In appellant's brief, page 3, it is alleged that defend-
ant admitted that plaintiff was entitled to credit of $215.00 
for feeding forty-three head of calves during the winter of 
1937-38. Let us examine the record: In paragraph 6 of 
plaintiff's amended complaint it is alleged that he wintered 
forty-three head of Grantsville cattle during the winter of 
1937-38 (R. 32). 
Defendant in Paragraph 4 of his answer to Amended 
Complaint denied that plaintiff ever wintered any cattle 
for the partnership after 1936-37; he admitted that plain-
tiff wintered cattle that belonged to the partnership dur-
ing the winter of 1936-37 (R. 36). 
In his reply to defendant's answer to the Amended Com-
plaint plaintiff adroitly admits that the forty-three head of 
cattle wintered by plaintiff was during the winter of 1937-
38 (R. 54). It will be observed that plaintiff thereby ad-
mits his own allegation that the Grantsville calves were 
wintered in 1937-38. He never denied that he wintered 
partnership cattle in 1936-7; it is true that it was stipulated 
that plaintiff wintered partnership cattle (Tr. 10). The 
plaintiff alleges he did and defendant admits he did; the 
dispute is as to what cattle were wintered and when. 
The only testimony ever given by Stevens so far as 
we are able to ascertain is found on pp. 542 and 543 of the 
transcript. 
After the plaintiff. had testified that he fed cattle dur-
ing the winters of 1936 and 7, 37 and 38 and 39 (Tr. 538) 
he was then asked if he was asking for credit for winter-
ing cattle; and he answered he was (Tr. 542). At no time 
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did the plaintiff identify the cattle wintered, where they 
were wintered, or in which year they were wintered. 
It was alleged in paragraph 5 of defendant's counter-
claim (R. 40) that defendant purchased, on October 30, 
1937, 215 head of cattle from Johnson and Wrathall, Plain-
tiff in his reply to defendant's counterclaim admits that 
defendant made said purchase (R. 55). 
Mr. Gray testified that the Wrathall and Johnson cattle 
(215 head) were purchased at Grantsville (Tr. 180). 
Mr. Gray was asked what disposition was made of the 
cattle that he purchased in Grantsville, and he answered: 
That they received the cattle over there; and weighed them 
and trailed them to St. Johns one day; the next day they 
took them to Fairfield and from Fairfield to Mosida, and 
the cattle were wintered at Mosida (Tr. 188). 
The cattle left at Mosida were wintered by Selby Dixon 
(Tr. 162-3). 
Mr. Stevens testified that Mr. Gray purchased certain 
cattle for the partnership and testified as follows: 
A. "There was one bunch 215 head, if I remem-
ber right and another bunch of 20 head. 
Q. ''Do you know where they were put? 
A. "Where they were put? 
Q. "Yes. 
A. "No, I don't remember it now." (Tr. 24). 
The cattle purchased by plaintiff are set out in para-
graph 5 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint (R. 30). Mr. 
Stevens testified as to the purchase, from whom purchased 
and where purchased. The testimony discloses that Ste-
vens purchased no cattle at Grantsville. 
The only cattle purchased at Grantsville were the ones 
purchased by defendant Gray (Tr. 188-9). Defendant tes-
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tified that two bunches were purchased at Grantsville. It 
is alleged in paragraph 5 of defendant's amended counter-
claim (R. 40) and admitted in paragraph 2A of plaintiff's 
reply (R. 55) that defendant purchased 215 head from 
Wrathall and Johnson on October 30, 1937; and that on 
September 23rd he purchased from Morris Wrathall and 
from Paul Wrathall 29 head. The defendant was asked 
the following question and gave the following answer: 
Q. "Do you know what the total number of cattle 
you purchased at Grantsville was? 
A. ''217 and 29. 
Q. "And 29 of them were sold? 
A. "29 were sold. 
Q. "And the others were taken to Mosida? 
A. "Yes, to Mosida. 
Q. "Do you know what time they arrived at Mo-
sida? 
A. "Sometime the latter part of October. 
MR. HANSEN: "What year? 
A. "1937. 
Q. ''These are the cattle bought where? 
A. "Grantsville." (Tr. 189). 
If plaintiff had wintered 43 head orf Grantsville cattle 
he would not have answered that he did not remember 
where they were put. The record is undisputed that the 
Grantsville cattle were all wintered at Mosida and none 
were wintered by Stevens. 
POINT FlOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ER!ROR IN 
MAKING ITS FINDING NO. 5 (R. 80) AND IN ALLOW-
ING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS MEN-
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TIONED IN POINT THREE OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGN-
MENT OF ERRORS. 
The plaintiff assigns error on the part of the Court in 
allowing defendant the following items: 
S4.08 Jackson Motor Company (R. 42). 
$65.00 for hay purchased from Hyrum McClellan (R. 
43). 
43). 
$193.00 for hay purchased from Albert McClellan (R. 
$19.78 for lumber to repair feed racks (R. 44). 
$22.90 telephone expense (R. 43). 
S19.20 telephone expense (R. 43). 
and $84.50 paid to R. E. Hluber for hay (R. 46). 
As to the item of $4.08 paid to Jackson Motor Company, 
the following will be observed: Defendant offered exhibits 
10-A, 10-B, 10-C and 10-D. Counsel for plaintiff objected 
to Ex. 10-A, 10-B, and 10-C. Further testimony was given 
as to Ex. 10-C and counsel for plaintiff asked to examine 
10-C; then counsel for defendant said he desired to inquire 
about 10-A, 10-B and 10-C, at which point plaintiff's coun-
sel stated: We will withdraw it with respect to all except 
the $2.50, which was (Ex. 10-A). The $4.08 about which 
counsel complained was admitted after counsel withdrew 
his objection to Ex. 10-B (Tr. 212). Further inquiry was 
not made with respect to the item, and if the Court com-
mitted any error counsel for plaintiff invited it. We can-
not now show what we would have shown with respect to 
it. 
As to the item of $65.00 paid to Hyrum McClellan (Ex. 
21) and the item of $193.00 paid to· Albert M·cClellan (Ex. 
22); the defendant testified that he paid $65.00 to Hyrum 
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McClellan for hay to feed the cattle and the same was for 
partnership purpose (Tr. 215). He further testified that 
the $193.00 was paid to Albert McClellan for hay to feed 
the cattle brought in from the range (Tr. 215-6). Counsel 
for appellant inquired if defendant was not claiming the 
item twice, once as hay and once as the reasonable charge 
for feeding the cattle, to which counsel for defendant an-
swered that it was for hay for the cattle between winter-
ing and feeding in pasture, and that it is not claimed in 
Par. 11 (Tr. 216). 
As to the item $19.78 for lumber to repair feed racks 
(Ex. 54) defendant testified that it was necessary to have 
the feed lot fixed up in order to feed the cattle (Tr. 227). 
We submit that the item is a proper partnership expense; 
defendant testified it was necessary in order to feed the 
cattle. Assume defendant had been required to secure the 
services of a veterinarian to care for some of the cattle, 
could there be any question as to the same being proper 
partnership expense? 
As to the item of $22.90 and $19.20 (Exs. 47 and 49) 
telephone expense claimed by defendant, defendant testi-
fied that the expense was for the benefit of the company 
(Tr. 225). We submit that it is impossible to conceive of 
defendant having overcharged the partnership in his claim 
for $42.10 in connection with the partnership business over 
a period of 28 months, defendant's testimony supports this 
view (Tr. 359-61). 
As to the item of $84.50 (Ex. 101) the defendant tes-
tified that the same was given to R. E. Huber for hay to 
feed the cattle in April, 1938 (Tr. 242). On redirect ex-
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amination defendant testified as follows: "I looked it up, 
for cattle we wintered and brought in early to my place." 
Q. "Were they partnership cattle? 
A. "Yes." (Tr. 373-74). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED 
FOR IDS OWN USE THE SUM OF $77,145.49 FROM THE 
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP CATTL\E MENTIONED IN 
POINT FIVE OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ER-
RORS. 
Plaintiff assigns errors on the part of the Court in 
charging defendant with only $76,145.49 from the sale of 
cattle. The record discloses that the defendant charged 
himself with the sale of 206 head of steers on March 2, 1939 
in the full sum of $18,839.80, being the second to the last 
item in paragraph 6 of defendant's amended counterclaim 
(R. 41). The said $18,839.80 included an overpayment from 
Cudahy and Company to defendant of $1,000.00. The ac-
tual purchase price of the 206 head of cattle sold March 
2, 1939, was $17,839.80. 
In Par. 7 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 32) plain-
tiff alleges that on March 4, 1939, plaintiff and defendan,t 
were owing the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork the sum 
of $3,000.00 on a partnership note in the amount of 
$6.000.00. In defendant's answer to plaintiff's amended 
complaint Par. 5 (R. 37) defendant denied the foregoing 
allegation and alleged that the $6,000.00 note was held by 
the Bank of Spanish Fork and not the Commercial Bank 
of Spanish Fork. Defendant further alleges that the 
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$4,300.00 note (Ex. C) set out in Par. 7 of plaintiff's amen-
ded complaint (R. 32-33) was paid by plaintiff and defend-
ant, plaintiff having paid $3,300.00 and defendant $1,000.00. 
As heretofore observed in our brief, page__J__, the defend-
ant testified that he went into the bank and paid Mr. Dixon 
(Tr. 423) 
We submit that a reading of the testimony during the 
time Mr. Dixon was on the stand (Tr. 75-83) will disclose 
that there is no dispute as to the payment by the defend-
ant of $1,000.00 upon the $4,300.00 note (Ex. C). We are 
not unmindful of defendant's testimony referred to on page 
6 of appellant's brief. It is our contentionJ however, that 
there is no dispute as to what the facts are; it was admit-
ted by counsel for plaintiff that a cashier's check for 
$1,000.00 was issued to someone who had been paid in ad-
vance (Tr. 77). . 
Counsel for plaintiff during the· time Mr. Dixon was 
on the stand made the following statement: 
''--that later on Mr. Dixon, as I understand his tes-
timony, prevailed on Mr. Gray to endorse the $10,000.00 
note; that Mr. Stevens later on paid that note except 
$1,000.00 which was paid by Mr. Gray--Now these are 
the facts which we will wish to show by this series of tran-
sactions, and that this $4,300.00 note went into the part-
nership and that is already agrood. Now we wish to show 
the indebtedness represented by this note is contined and 
$1,000.00 was paid by Mr. Gray and the principal and in-
terest by Mr. Stevens." (Tr. 79). 
Counsel for plaintiff stated: 
MR. HANSEN: "The only thing I am now interested 
in is whether you admit that this note of $4,300.00 was 
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paid, a thousand by Gray on the date he claims, and the rest 
was paid by Mr. Stevens. If you will admit that I don't care 
anything about the other ramification of it." 
MR. WORTHEN: "You mean on the note which was 
given at the time this was taken up." 
MR. HANSEN: "He paid $3,300.00 and Mr. Gray paid 
a $1,000.00; that is all I am interested in." (Tr. 80). 
Defendant's counsel stated: 
MR. PORTER: "We are willing to stipulate that this 
Exhibit C was paid; and that the evidence of the pay would 
be that on March 18, 1941, Gray paid $1,000.00 and that 
the balance of the note was paid by Mr. Stevens. Now as 
I understand it that would be their testimony." (Tr. 81). 
Counsel for defendant further stated: 
MR. PORTER: '' That will be their testimony, that 
the ExhibitC was the note from the Bank of Spanish Fork; 
and that it was merged into the obligation of Mr. Stevens 
at the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, on or about the 
13th day of November, 1939; and that the testimony of 
Mr. Dixon would be that upon the obligation into which 
this was merged, Mr. Gray paid $1000.00 on the 18th day 
of March, 1941; and that his testimony would be further, 
that Mr. Stevens paid the balance." (Tr. 81). 
We call the Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to the 
answer (R. 53) and particularly to P. 12 thereof (R. 64). 
It will be observed that plaintiff sets out the amounts with 
which defendant should be charged; the first item reads as 
follows: Cash admittedly received from sale of cattle, the 
amount originally typed in was $77,145.49 that amount has 
been changed to $76,145.49. Several other changes have 
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been made substituting figures in ink for figures originally 
typed on that page (R. 64), in order to reconcile the total 
with the changes made in the various items. 
We submit that plaintiff's counsel had forgotten when 
he prepared his brief that his pleadings admit that the cash 
received f~om the sale of cattle by defendant was $76,145.49; 
certainly the Court was justified in charging defendant with 
only $76,145.49. 
Defendant was either entitled to have the figure show-
ing the amount received from sales of cattle reduced 
$1,000.00 to $76,145.49 or to have credit of $1,000.00 to 
which he was entitled for moneys expended for the part-
nership. Defendant certainly is not entitled to be charged 
with the full $77,145.49 which included the overpayment 
to Cudahy without being credited with that payment at 
some other place in the account. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED 
FOR HIS OWN USE THE AMOUNTS MENTIONED IN 
FOINT SIX OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ER-
RORS. 
In point six set out in the index appellant's counsel con-
tends that defendant received $341.04 from the sale of two 
steers, and $356.00 from the sale of seven cows belonging 
to the partnership. 
Under point 6 as the same is set out on page 24 of ap-
pellant's brief and again on page 52 of appellant's brief ap-
pellant seeks to charge defendant with three items as fol-
lows: 
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$341.0-1 for the sale of 3 steers. 
$201.62 for the sale of 2 steers. 
S356 for the sale of 7 cows belonging to the partner-
ship. 
The Court's attention is called to paragraph 6 of de-
fendant's further answer and counterclaim (R. 40 and 41); 
defendant sets out in said paragraph the list of cattle sold 
and the amounts received by the respective partners from 
the proceeds of said sales. Defendant charges himself with 
the first four items set out in said paragraph, the next four 
items he charges to the plaintiff, to-wit: 
3 steers $341.04. 
2 steers $201.62. 
7 cows $356.00, sold at Delta. 
1 steer $99.00 
In plaintiff's answer to defendant's amended counter-
claim plaintiff denied that" he received the proceeds from 
the sale of the last four mentioned items. Plaintiff's assign-
ment of errors No. 6 is directed to the Court's finding on 
that issue in favor of defendant. 
May we observe at the outset that counsel in his brief 
at P. 52 concedes that the plaintiff should be charged with 
the $99.00 for the sale of one steer, which item plaintiff de-
nied receiving (R. 56). 
As to the items of $341.04 and $201.62, defendant tes-
tified that he had in the feed lot seventeen head of com-
pany cattle; that one cow brought $52.26, 2 heifers brought 
$91.46 and 2 cows brought $112.75 (Tr. 141). He further 
testified that 3 steers brought $341.04, that 2 steers brought 
$201.62, that one steer brought $99.00 (Tr. 141). 
Defendant testified that he received from the proceeds 
of said sales the sum of $256.41, that plaintiff received the 
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balance of $997.66. The $256.41 which defendant admits 
he received represents the price received from the first 3 
items shown at the top of the page under sales (R. 41). 
The first four items listed on said page under debit Stevens 
represents the $997.66 which defendant testified was re-
ceived by the plaintiff (R. 41) (Tr. 141). 
On cros.s examination defendant testified as follows: 
Q. "I am referring to these debits that you have 
made to Stevens here $341.04, $201.65, $90.00 and 
$356.00. I understood you to say that Stevens got that 
money, is that right? 
A. "That is right." (Tr. 305). 
As to the 7 cows sold at Delta for $356.00 included in 
the charges against Stevens we submit that the testimony 
of the plaintiff is the most ·convincing testimony that could 
be offered in favor of the defendant. 
The plaintiff under cross examination testified that he 
was not at Delta at the time the 7 head of cows were sold 
(Tr. 664-65) The plaintiff next testified that he did not 
remember that he was in Delta at the time the cattle were 
sold (Tr. 67). 
On redirect examination the witness was asked the 
following questions and gave the following answers: 
Q. "Well did you participate in the sale of them? 
A. "If I remember right I was there when the 
cattle were sold. 
Q. ''You were there when they were sold; where 
were they sold? 
A. "As I remember they were sold at Delta, Utah. 
Q. "Well were the cattle at Delta when they were 
sold? 
A. "Yessir." (Tr. 69). 
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Defendant testified that the seven cows were sold to 
Evan Johnson at Delta and that plaintiff got the money 
for them (Tr. 139). 
On cross examination defendant testified that St&-
Yens was there when the seven cows were sold; that they 
were sold at Delta and Stevens got the money (Tr. 315-
316). 
Clyde Cowan testified that he hauled seven head of 
cattle from Garrison, Utah, to Delta, Utah. That he saw 
Mr. Stevens at Garrison, Utah, when he loaded the cattle; 
and saw both Mr. Stevens and Mr. Gray at Delta after the 
cattle were unloaded, that he delivered the weigh bills for 
the cattle (Tr. 590-2). 
We submit that there was substantial and competent 
evidence to justify the Court in finding that plaintiff re-
ceived the items mentioned in plaintiff's assignment of er-
rors No.6. The Court saw the witnesses and heard them 
testify and his finding is supported by the evidence. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
FAILING TO CHARGE DEFENDANT WITH AT LEAST 
THIRTY-ONE HEAD OF PARTNERSIDP CATILE MEN-
TIONED IN POINT SEVEN OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGN-
MENT OF ERRORS. 
Under point 7 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff claims that 
defendant failed to account for 31 head of partnership cat-
tle. On P. 55 of his brief counsel sets out that plaintiff 
failed to account for 35 head. 
In Par. 8A of plaintiff's answer to the amended counter-
claim (R. 61) plaintiff alleges on information and belief that 
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defendant had disposed of 109 head of cattle to persons and 
for amounts unknown to plaintiff for which he had not 
accounted. Yet in Par. lOA of answer to amended coun-
terclaim plaintiff admits that defendant had accounted for 
1370 head of the 1405 head purchased for the partnership 
(R. 62). 
On P. 10 of appellant's brief it is stated, "it is further 
made to appear that defendant for the most part had the 
exclusive possession of the partnership cattle especially 
while they were in the feed lots being fattened for market." 
It is undisputed, however, that the largest block of 
partnership cattle ever sold were sold by the plaintiff, 405 
head. He contracted for said sale; he received the check; 
it was made to him personally and was deposited by him 
in his name (Tr. 24-25). 
It is undisputed that 7 head of cattle were sold at Delta 
in March of 1937 and that plaintiff received the money (Tr. 
69, 139, 590-2). 
The testimony discloses that a substantial number of 
cattle ~ere under the control and direction of the plaintiff 
during the winter of 1936 and 37. 500 head of cattle were 
purchased by plaintiff between Nov. 24 and Dec. 10, 1936, 
25 head (Gonder cattle) were purchased in the month of 
March, 1937 (Par. 5 Amended Complaint, R. 31). 
Mr. Stevens testified he purchased cattle from Mr. Oak-
ley on Nov. 23, 1936; that 3 head were put into the feed 
yard and the balance were turned into the herd we win-
tered otherwise. (Tr. 17). 
Mr. Stevens testified that some of the cattle he pur-
chased in the fall of 1936 were taken to the Selby Dixon 
ranch at Mosida (Tr. 23). That he did not know how many 
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head were turned to Mr. Dixon and he did not know how 
many head were fed by Mr. Gray. 
It was stipulated that Selby Dixon wintered cattle in 
· 1936-37 and 37 and 38; he testified that during the first 
year he wintered their cattle (1936-37) there were over 
200 head (Tr. 165). 
Mr. Gray testified that 7 head of the Gonder cattle 
were brought from Nevada and put in his feed lot (Tr. 139- , 
40). 
He testified that he had a total of 17 head of partner-
ship cattle in his feed lot in the spring of 1937 and t:hat he 
had 300 of his own and 36 of Mr. Stevens (Tr. 141). 
Defendant corrected his testimony as to the number 
of head in the spring of 37 to 18 instead of 17 (Tr. 142). 
On cross examination Mr. Gray testified that the cattle 
he had at the ranch in the spring of 1937 were cattle that 
Stevens bought in the fall of 1936 and some in the spring 
of 1937 (Tr. 300). He further testified ''the bunch of cattle, 
around 17 or 18 head, they were to winter over we put in 
the feed lot with my cattle which I had around 300 head 
of steers at the time on feed" (Tr. 300). 
The defendant was asked what disposition was made 
of the cattle placed in the feed lot, to which he answered, 
"they were sold" (Tr. 140-141). 
Defendant testified to the sale of the animals in his 
feed lot, which are the animals discussed under point 6 of 
plaintiff's brief, page 52, and under point 6 of respondent's 
brief. We submit that the evidence establishes conclusively 
that defendant wintered only 17 or 18 head of partnership 
cattle during the winter of 1936-37 (Tr. 141). 
Defendant made no charge to the partnership, what-
soever, for feeding partnership cattle in the winter of 1936-
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37; the first charge made by defendant against the part-
nership for pasturing or feeding any cattle was in May of 
1937 (R. 46). 
Plaintiff testified that 3 of the Oakley cattle were put 
into the feed yard and the others were turned into the herd 
we wintered otherwise." 
The plaintiff testified that all the cattle except the 
Garrison and Baker cattle (186 head) were taken away and 
put in the yards here in Utah County (Tr. 73). 
We submit that the testin1ony establishes that in the 
spring of 1937 Gray had in his feed lot 300 head of his own 
steers, 36 of Stevens' steers; that he had possession of no 
partnership cattle during the winter of 36 and 37 except 17 
or 18 head. 
The evidence establishes that in addition to the 17 or 
18 head in Gr.ay's feed lot 7 were sold at Delta, 186 remained 
in Nevada, 74 were in Sage Valley, 200 were at Mosida. 
That accounts for 484 or 485 head of cattle purchased by 
Stevens prior to March 15, 1937; where were the. other 41 
head? 
An examination of the cattle fed and pastured by Gray 
subsequent to the first day of May, 1937, will disclose that 
1370 head of cattle was all that he had possession of and 
all that were sold by him or in the sale of which he par-
ticipated 
Stevens admits that he wintered partnership cattle; 
he testified that he had no partnership cattle at his place 
in the spring of 1938. It is established beyond any ques-
tion that he never wintered any Grantsville cattle. 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DE-
FENDANT S1,000.00 FOR THlE USE OF DEFENDANT'S 
PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE IN TRANSACTING PART-
NERSHIP BUSINESS. 
At page____..S'---_of our brief we discussed the defend-
ant's use of his personal automobile in connection with the 
business. Defendant claimed in Par. 12 of his amended 
counterclaim the sum of $1,000.00 for the use of his per-
sonal automobile (R. 48). Plaintiff in Par. 9a of his answer 
to amended counterclaim (R. 62) admitted that defendant 
used his automobile for the partnership business; admitted 
the value per mile to be 5c; claimed that his automobile was 
not used in excess of 7500 miles and admitted· that defend-
ant was entitled to not more than $375.00. 
The Court, however, made no allowance to defendant 
for the use of his automobile. The credits which the Court 
\ 
allowed defendant are set out in Par. 5 of the Findings of 
Fact (R. 80-81). The items of expense allowed by the Court 
are set out in Par. 5 (d) (e) (f) and (g) covering Par. 8a, 
8b, 8c, and Par. 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim. 
Defendant testified to the extensive use of his auto-
mobile; that no automobile other than defendant's was used 
in connection with partnership business. In addition to the 
traveling admitted by plaintiff on 'pages 21 and 22 of his 
brief, the evidence discloses that many trips were made by 
defendant from Payson to Salt Lake City and Ogden; that 
many trips were made to Sage Valley; that trips were made 
to Richfield, Minersville, Heber City, Fairfield, Nephi, Delta, 
Fillmore, Milford and Spanish Fork. 
The two banks used by the partners for depositing part- , 
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nership funds, as well as their personal accounts, were lo-
cated in Spanish Fork. In fact, reading the testimony of 
the defendant (Tr. 132-148) will show the extent to which 
defendant used his automobile. Plaintiff impliedly admitted 
at P. 22 of his brief that the automobile was used not less 
than 15,000 miles; it is there stated: "The evidence will not 
support a finding that defendant drove his automobile on 
partnership business to exceed 15,000 miles." Two wit-
nesses testified as to the reasonable charge for operating 
the automobile. Defendant's witness LeGrand F. Smith 
testified that the cost of operating an automobile, at the 
time, was 7c per mile (Tr. 454). Plaintiff's witness Paul 
D. Vincent placed the cost at 5c per mile (Tr. 555); the 
Court made no award whatever. 
· Counsel for appellant assumed in his brief that the 
Court had made an award for the use of defendant's auto-
mobile. At P. 22 oi his brief counsel made the following 
statement: 
"We do not know what the Trial Court found as 
to mileage or cost per mile, but if he found the cost of 
operating an automobile was 7c per mile, such finding 
would find support in the evidence." 
If defendant used his car for the business of the part-
nership 15,000 miles at the cost of 7c per mile, the amount 
which the plaintiff impliedly admits defendant is entitled 
to would be $1,050.00; defendant, however, claims only 
$1,000.00 
" We submit that the pleadings and the testimony war-
rant an allowance in fiavor of defendant for the use of his 
personal automobile for partnership business in the amount 
of $1,000.00, and there is no substantial evidence justify-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
ing a finding of any amount less than the amount claimed 
by defendant. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DE-
FENDANT $1,701.23 BEING THE AMOUNT PAID BY 
DEFENDANT AS INTEREST IN EXCESS OF THE 
AMOUNT OF INTEREST PAID BY PLAINTIFF. 
As observed by counsel for appellant at P. 57 of his 
brief, it was stipulated at the opening of the trial that the 
Court in reaching a final conclusion as to the obligation of 
one partner to the other should take into ·consideration ad-
vances by each partner, and that interest at the rate of 6% 
per annum should be charged on all advances for the bene-
fit of the partnersip until same was repaid (Tr. 5-7). 
It has already been called to the Court's attention that 
plaintiff between the 12th of Nov., 1936, and the 15th of 
March, 1937, expended for the purchases of cattle a total 
of $26,303.47 (R. 31) 
An examination of Par. 6 of plaintiff's amended com-
plaint (R. 31) discloses that plaintiff between the 12th of 
Nov., 1936, and the 28th day of December, 1936, expended 
for the partnership the sum of $1,552.87. That on March 
31, 1937, plaintiff expended the sum of $500.00. That be-
tween Sept. 17, 1937, and Dec. 16, 1937, he·expended $2,-
377.00; and that between Jan. 7, 1938, and April 11, 1938, 
plaintiff expended for the partnership $4,048.00. The above 
items are the principal items of expenses set out in said 
paragraph. 
It further appear, as stated in Point 5 of our brief, that 
plaintiff paid $3,300.00 on a partnership note March 18, 
1941. 
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It will be observed that plaintiff by his pleadings 
claimed that his total expenditures on behalf of the part-
nership were $38,091.07 (R. 63). That on April 7, 1937, de-
fendant deposited to plaintiff's credit the sum of $10,520.70. 
On March 22, 1938, plaintiff reimbursed himself from the 
sale of- 405 head of cattle the sum of $18,349.47 (R. 5 and 
R. 63). 
It therefore becomes apparent that the amount of in-
terest to which plaintiff is entitled is interest on $10,520.75 
to April 7, 1937, or interest in the approximate amount of 
$190.00 plus interest on further sums as plaintiff advanced 
until repaid. 
It is apparent from the pleadings that the defendant's 
expenditures for and on behalf of the partnership far ex-
ceeded the expenditures by plaintiff. We call the Court's 
attention to the fact that there is no dispute as to the 
amount expended by both partners for the purchase of 
cattle. An examination of Par. 5 of defendant's amended 
counterclaim shows the purchases made by defendant, the 
date of purchase, from whom purchased and the amount 
expended (R. 40). Defendant expended for the purchase 
of cattle the sum of $8,868.77 between March 27, 1937, and 
May 7, 1937. On Aug. 10, 1937, he spent $1,940.00; on Sept. 
23, 1937, defendant spent $2,767.47; on Oct. 26 and 30, 1937, 
defendant spent $10,940.43 for the purchase of partnership 
cattle. 
It will therefore appear that up to Oct. 30, 1937, de-
fendant had ex;pended $24,316.67 or about $4,000.00 less 
than plaintiff had expended for the purchase of cattle. 
It will further appear from said Paragraph (R.40) that 
on April 19 1938, defendant spent $18,531.71 for the pur-
chase of cattle for the partnership. On Dec. 15, 1938, he 
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spent 8:2.195.28. and on Jan. 11, 1939, he spent $2,000.00. 
It therefore becomes apparent that the amount of interest 
to which plaintiff would be entitled in connection with the 
purchase of cattle would be far less than the amount to 
which defendant would be entitled. 
It further appears from Par. 8 of defendant's amended 
counterclaim (R. 42-44) that defendant expended for the 
partnership including the care of the cattle in Baker, Ne-
vada, the sum of $9,199.84. 
An examination of Par. 11 of defendant's amended 
counterclaim discloses that defendant likewise expended for 
feed, pasture, labor and other items set out therein the to-
tal sum of $38,367.15. 
We call attention to Par. 6 of defendant's amended 
counterclaim, which shows total sales of cattle, proceeds, 
and how applied (R. 41). 
It appears therefrom that defendant, up to March 15, 
1937, received $356.41 (Tr. 141); and on Aug. 19 and Oct. 
1, 1937, the further sum of $18,833.11. It therefore ap-
pears that during the year 1937 defendant had spent for 
cattle $24,316.67, and plaintiff had spent during the fall of 
1936 and 1937, $26,303.47; during said time defendant had 
deposited to plaintiff's personal account $10,520.70. On 
March 22, 1938, plaintiff received from sales $18,349.47 
(R. 63) and up to that date defendant had expended the 
amount set out in Par. 8 and Par. 11 of defendant's amen-
ded counterclaim (R. 42, 43 and 47), in excess of $23,000.00, 
and by April 19, 1938, defendant had expended for cattle 
the additional sum of $18,531.17 (R. 40), and had incurred 
the additional expenses for the partnership as alleged in 
Par. 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim in excess of 
$14,400.00 (R. 47). 
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We submit that Par. 13 and Par. 14 (R. 50) sets out 
the interest to which each partner is entitled and properly 
reflects the interest computed on the amount expended by 
each partner until repayn1ent to said partner. That plain-
tiff is entitled to credit in the amount of $1,653.31 and Gray 
is entitled to the following items of interest: $647.08, $465.10, 
and $2,242.36, or a total of $3,354.54, and that the amount 
of interest to which defendant is entitled in the sum of 
$1,701.23. 
POINT ,TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DE-
FENDANT THE SUM OF $1,542.56, THE REASONABLE 
VALUE OF TIDRTY-ONE HEAD OF MINERSVILLE 
CATTLE PURCHASED BY PLAINTIFF FOR THE PART-
NERSHIP IN 1936, AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR BY 
PLAINTIFF. 
Under Point 7 we discussed plaintiff's claim that de-
fendant should be charged with at least 31 head of cattle 
not accounted for. We deem it unnecessary to again discuss 
this point other than to call attention to our Point 7 and 
observe that if any cattle were ·unaccounted for it was the 
cattle wintered by plaintiff in 1936 and 1937. We there 
pointed out that plaintiff claimed that he wintered cattle, 
we admit that he wintered cattle. Plaintiff claimed he win-
tered Grantsville cattle, the record discloses that he win-
tered no Grantsville cattle. If either partner is to be charged 
with cattle unaccounted for it is plaintiff, on account of the 
cattle he wintered in 1936 and 1937 arid failed to account 
for. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the Court's findings of fact are sup-
ported by the evidence, and by the preponderance of the 
evidence, and that the only error made by the Court was 
in failing to allow defendant the full amount to which he 
was entitled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. W. WORTHEN, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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